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1. The Story of Subsidization
German shipyards were hit extremely hard during World War II,
and then again in the following years when the parts that had
not been damaged were disassembled by the Allies. But World
War II and its consequences proved to be a blessing in dis-
guise as it opened possibilities for a very prosperous ship-
building industry in the fifties. That is, the yards were
rapidly rebuilt with modern equipment, partly through Marshal-
Fund aid. Since many of the refugees front the eastern parts of
Germany had settled in the coastal regions of West Germany, a
qualified work force was readily available. Relatively high
productivity and low wages made German shipyards highly com-
petitive and, as a result, by the mid-fifties, German ship-
building industry had grown to become number two in Europe
after the UK; 17.3 p.c. of vessels completed worldwide in 1956
were built on yards of the Federal Republic (see table 1).
At the beginning of the sixties, however, the German shipbuil-
ding industry lost its competitiveness. It was especially
Japan which rapidly captured market shares: whereas in 1960
Japan built 21.9 p.c. of vessels in the world, in 1965 it was
already producing 41.5 p.c. To be specific, Japan's gain with-
in five years was actually higher than the share of every
other shipbuilding country (see table 1). Under this constel-
lation the German Federal Government started the First Ship-
building Assistance Program (Werfthilfeprogramm) in order to























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Lloyd s Register of Shipping (various issues)
calculations.
•<- Verband der deutschen Schiffbauindustrie e.V. (various issues).- Own- 3 -
(Deutscher Bundestag,1967 and 1970). The program was meant to
facilitate the financing of ship exports to Non-EEC-Countries.
Nonetheless it could not prevent German shipyards from losing
further market shares: They fell from 13.4 p.c. in 1960 to 7.2
p.c. in 1968, while the volume of production remained more or
less constant (see table 1 and Al).
As the worldwide demand for large oil tankers and bulk car-
riers rapidly increased, Japan and Sweden responded but in
differing ways. Whereas Japan buildt new yards, Sweden devel-
oped and installed new techniques for series production of
these types of ships. While investment in shipbuilding in
Japan and Sweden was high, it was , very low in the Federal
Republic and, as a result productivity increased only slowly.
The number of employees decreased by 30 thousand from 1960 to
1968 (see table A2). However, such negative developments could
be compensated for, since other industries grew very rapidly
at the same time, absorbing many of those employees laid off.
Thus a regional unemployment problem did not occur.
Economic currents were moretheless changing and the first
severe recession after World War II in the Federal Republic
occured in 1967.It brougt about unemployment which, in retro-
spect, appears moderate, but it was concentrated in the mining
districts and some coastal regions.Thus for the first time,
politicians realized that German shipbuilding had lost market
shares in the foregoing years. Studies on the prevailing
situation and prospects for the ship-building industry were- 4 -
ordered. They came to the conclusion that especially big yards
had lost competitiveness. Small and medium sized ones, on the
other hand were judged as fairly competitive. The experts'
advice was aimed at enabling the big yards to take part in the
growing market for large ships (Arbeitgemeinschaft Werftgut-
achten, 1970). Politicians responded to these recommendations.
The federal government, created a program to support invest-
ment in which the four coastal states participated. Under this
program yards received subsidized credits, if kinds of invest-
ment were undertaken for building big ships, new types of
ships, or for new production techniques (series building; see
Bundesminister fur Wirtschaft, 1968). This program did not
remain the only state intervention with regard to investment
in the shipbuilding industry. Contrary to their original in-
tention, regional programs, which were basically meant to
promote a wide range of activities in specific regions, were
used intensively to promote the shipbuilding industry. Fur-
thermore, the federal states of Schleswig-Holstein and of
Bremen became joint proprietors of big yards in Kiel, Hamburg
and Bremen. This was justified on the grounds that these yards
would otherwise not have been able to undertake investments
considered necessary by the respective governments (Landes-
haushaltsplan Schleswig-Holstein, 1975). But not only invest-
ment in the yards was supported, demand for new vessels built
in the Federal Republic was stimulated, too. The Shipbuilding
Assistance Program (Werfthilfeprogramm) , which originally had
been limited to exports to Non-EC-Countries, was extended:
Beginning in 1971 exports of ships to EC-countries were assis-- 5 -
ted as well and, since 1973, financial support from this pro-
gram was extended to orders from German shipping companies
(Langer, 1974; Deutscher Bundestag 1973). But despite the
extension of the Shipbuilding Assistance Program, German ship-
ping companies increasingly ordered their vessels abroad.
Consequently, the Federal Government restricted the Shipowner-
Aid (Reederhilfe - financial support to which the shipping
companies had been entitled until the beginning of the fifties
for every vessel ordered, no matter whether at home or abroad)
to ships built on yards in the Federal Republic. In order to
utilize the yards'new capacities for building large ships, an
additional facility was established to support the demand of
oil tankers.
Indeed, shipbuilding production on German yards grew: in 1975
it was twice as high as 1968. But increasing production was
based more on the fact that worldwide demand, especially for
large ships, exceeded the shipbuilding capacities in other
countries than on real competitive advantage. Then even with
far-reaching state assistance, the German shipbuilding in-
dustry continued to lose further market shares (see table 1).
Nevertheless the large yards earned high profits in the mid
seventies. The state owned yards were partly released from
profit distribution, so that these yards were able to accumu-
late high reserves. In 1976, capacity utilization of German
yards declined sharply. Orders of oil tankers and bulk car-
riers had already dropped as a result of the first oil crisis
and the world recession in 1974. Especially those yards were- 6 -
hit that followed the politicians' advice and had just recent-
ly specialized in these types of ships. The decreased demand
for vessels on world markets soon revealed that the shipbuild-
ing industry in the Federal Republic, as well as in other
traditional shipbuilding countries, had lost international
competitiveness. New shipbuilding countries - especially
South-Korea - gained market shares rapidly (see table 1) .
Politicians looked for new possibilities to compensate for the
decline in production andxthey proved successful. Since ves-
sels exported to developing countries are entitled to a higher
subsidy rate than usual exports, the Shipbuilding Assistance
Program was therefore mainly used to finance ships declared as
developing projects. According to OECD-guidelines, ship exports
to developing countries are accepted as developing projects if
the grant element exceeds 25 p.c. of building costs (Kreditan^-
stalt fiir Wiederaufbau, 1981)
1. Furthermore, the Federal Mi-
nistry of Research and Technology set up several R & D- pro-
grams in favour of the yards. In no other industry did support
for research and development increase so rapidly as in ship-
building between 1973/74 and 1979/80/81 (Jiittemeier, 1984) .
Furthermore the Ministry of Defence ordered new ships earlier
than originally planned and in deference to the employment
problems of the large yards it accepted substantial financial
disadvantages (MatthSfer, 1977). But the decline of production
and of orders could not be stopped and yards reduced their
For normal ship-orders the grant element can amount to about 7
p.c. of building costs (Verband der Deutschen Schiffbauin-
dustrie, 1982).- 7 -
work-force: The number of employees shrank from 73 thousand in
1975 to 59 thousand in 1979. During this period, the large
yards tried to regain those segments of the shipbuilding mar-
ket (special ships) which they had given up at the end of the
sixties and on which medium and small sized yards had been
fairly successful in the meantime. The above mentioned large
reserves of state-owned yards (i.e. no profit distribution)
enabled some of them to offer prices that did not even cover
their costs.
In order to avoid high regional unemployment, which the Fede-
ral Government and the governments of the coastal states would
have to face if yards had to dismiss workers on a large scale,
a direct building subsidy program (Auftragshilfeprogramm) was
operated during 1979 to 1981. Only the construction of special
vessels was subsidized, oil tankers and bulk carriers were
excluded (Deutscher Bundestag, 1979). The support from this
program enabled the large yards to continue their efforts in
gaining back markets lost to medium and small-sized yards.
When the Federal Government refused to participate in finan-
cing a second direct building subsidy program, the coastal
states decided to run such a program on their own. But all
these government interventions in favour of the shipbuilding
industry could not prevent large yards from running into se-
vere difficulties. AG-Weser at Bremen closed down at the end
of 1983 and the remaining yards at Bremen were merged with
substantial financial support of the State of Bremen. The
federal state of Schleswig-Holstein covered losses of Ho-- 8 -
waldtswerke Deutsche-Werft AG, the biggest German shipyard,
located in Kiel and Hamburg; capacities for the building of
new ships were closed at Hamburg and reduced at Kiel. Indeed,
those yards were hit hardest which in particular had been
subject to state intervention at the beginning of the seven-
ties. The number of employees on large yards shrank by 45 p.c.
within a period of ten years (from 1975 to 1985) . The medium
and small-sized yards reduced their work-force, too, but much
more moderately (by 17 p.c.;, see Rother, 1985).
In 1985 it became obvious that the market for special ships
was too narrow for both small and medium sized yards plus the
remaining large yards, the latter having been highly subsi-
dized in the years before. In addition, new orders for ships
declined further. This was partly due to the fact that, at the
end of 1984, extensive write-off possibilities for individual
investors placing their money in loss making areas, like ship-
owning, had been cut. Though a favourable exemption was made
for investment in ships, money spent for shipping activities
declined sharply. Many yards began to establish ship-owning
companies, thus building vessels on their accounts. The go-
vernments of the coastal states, especially that of Schleswig-
Holstein, sanctioned the yards' procedure by giving guarantees
to the capital which yards spent on these ships. At the begin-
ning of 1986, it became obvious that real demand did not exist
for these vessels. As a consequence, the yards now have to
write off the ships they have built and governments are faced
with claims to pay for the yards' losses if their bankruptcy
is to be avoided.- 9 -
The governments of the four coastal states ordered a study on
the situation and prospects of the shipbuilding, industry and
on what governments should do. The experts recommended a 30
p.c. reduction of merchant shipbuilding capacities. In order
to manage the process of capacity reduction and to solve the
current liquidity problems they support additional financial
assistance on a large scale. Existing programs - Shipowner Aid
and Shipbuilding Assistance Program - should be endowed with
more favourable conditions and a new direct shipbuilding pro-
gram should be introduced to ensure the utilization of the
remaining 70 p.c. of merchant shipbuilding capacities (Insti-
tut fiir Seeverkehrswirtschaf t und -logistik, Treuarbeit,
1986). As it seems governments are willing to follow these
recommendations. They are running the risk of getting deeper
into the jungle of subsidies than ever before. Thus the story
of shipbuilding's subsidization will continue for sure.
2. The Extent of Protection
Quantifying the degree of protection is difficult because
information on all relevant measures is lacking or because the
subsidy element of some kinds of intervention cannot be de-
fined. More or less complete information is available with
regard to the financial support given through specific pro-
grams like Shipbuilding Assistance Programs, Shipowner-Aids,
Direct Building Subsidy Program and' Investment-Aid Programs.
From 1966 to 1985, the Federal Government and the coastal
states supported the shipbuilding industry out of these pro-- 10 -
grams with nearly eight billion D-Mark and the volume of sub-
sidies increased in the course of time (see table 2) . The
coastal states seem to have been engaged only to a relatively
small extent; during the whole period, only 7 p.c. of all
subsidies were financed by them. But financial assistance
granted by the coastal states has gained in importance with
time: From 1966 to 1970, their share was just to 2.2 p.c. but
during the last five years, it ran up to 12.5 p.c. and a fur-
ther increase of coastal-states
1 engagement can be expected
against the background of the current developments in ship-
building policy.
In addition to the subsidies out of specific programs, the
yards have received support from non-industry specific pro-
grams, as well. As table 3 shows, above all, financial aids




































































































Source: Deutscher Bundestag (various issues). - Bundeshaushaltsplan (various issues). - Baushaltsplan Schleswig-Holstein
(various issues). - Haushaltsplan Hanfeurg (various issues). - Haushaltsplan Lower Saxony (various issues). - Haus-
haltsplan Breoen (various issues). - Own calculations and estimates.- 11 -
out of regional and R&D-Programs are relevant. In principle,
such programs should have no discriminatory effects among
industries because their purpose, is to support regions in
general or economic activities in R&D respectively. But in
fact these programs have been handled to benefit the shipbuil-
ding industry more than others. This is true in the case of
regional programs in the first half of the seventies and in
the case of R&D-support in the early seventies and the be-
ginning of the eighties (Lammers, 1984 a).
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The volume of subsidies presented so far shows only part of
the shipbuilding industry's protection: government partici-
pation in yards, releases on profit distributions of yards- 12 -
partly owned by governments, guarantees and governmental pur-
chases of ships are not included. Quantifying their subsidy
elements causes large problems because information on these
measures is incomplete and thus requiring questionable assump-
tions to be made. Surely the protection element of some of
these measures is substantial. This should be kept in mind,
considering the amounts presented in Table 2 and 3. Neverthe-
less, the available figures already show that the shipbuilding
industry is protected to an extraordinary extent.
In 1973 and 1974, the shipbuilding industry received 3300
D-Mark subsidies per employed person yearly and during the
period 1979 to 1982: 9660 D-Mark per person were paid each
year. The degree of subsidization (subsidies as percentage of
net value added minus subsidies) amounts to 12.2 p.c. in
1973/74 and 29.5 p.c. in the period from 1979 to 1982 (Jtitte-
meier,1986). Assuming that the subsidies granted to the ship-
building industry remained in this sector, which seems very
likely in view of the demand and supply conditions of the
relevant output- and input-markets, a subsidization degree of
29.5 p.c. indicates that payment rates for labour and capital
could be higher by this rate as compared to a situation with-
out subsidies. With regard to the construction of individual
ships, an even higher degree of subsidization was possible.
This can be demonstrated with the conditions of the different
programs: The financial aid out of the Shipbuilding Assistancedes Instituts fiir Weltwmschatt
- 13 -
Program can reach 7 p.c. of building costs (Verband der Deut-
schen Schiffbauindustrie, 1982); the Ship-Owner Aid, which has
to be regarded as a subsidy favouring shipbuilding only,
amounts to 12.5 p.c. of building costs and the Direct Building
Subsidy operated during 1979 to 1981 could add up to 20 p.c.
of building costs. As cumulation of these financial aids was
allowed, theoretically 40 p.c. of building costs could be
financed out of public funds. To revail the effective rate of
subsidization, the financial aids have to be related to the
contribution which is provided by the yard itself (value added)
and not to total building costs. Assuming an intermediate
2
input rate of 60 p.c. and assuming that building costs were
(only) subsidized by 30 p.c. this would mean that 75 p.c. of
the payment for labour and capital, involved in the building
of respective ships, is financed by the taxpayer. If govern-
ments endow the existing programs or introduce new ones - as
seems to be the case - the contribution of the tax payer will
still be higher.
3. Impact of Subsidization
It is hardly possible to quantify exactly the degree of pro-
tection and the impacts of the numerous protective measures.
But economic logic and the situation on relevant product- and
For "normal" exports; ships declared as "developing projects"
are subsidized by 25 p.c. of building costs at least (see page
5).
2
The input-rate of shipbuilding industry as a whole accounts
for 60 p.c. at the end of the seventies.- 14 -
factor-markets suggest that the impact is as follows:
- with regard to the production of ships: The different pro-
grams have enabled the yards to offer ships at prices and
financial conditions which, from the customers
1 point of
view, appeared competitive. To this extent production of
ships on German yards was surely higher than without subsi-
dies; but even increasing subsidization of shipbuilding
could not prevent the decline of production and the loss of
world-market shares.
- with regard to profits and investment: Since 1962, the ship-
building industry made profits only in the years 1967, 1972
- 1977 and 1983. Apart from 1975, the return on investment
was far below that of total manufacturing (see Table A2) .
Even with subsidies, capital owners were not able to obtain
a return on investment comparable to investment in other
activities. Thus the owners of the yards can hardly be re-
garded as the beneficiaries of subsidization policy. Never-
theless, investment in shipbuilding has been undertaken up
through today. Such an attitude can hardly be based on ra-
tional motives of private capital owners. Instead, it can be
considered as the result of continuing state interference.
This led capital owners to believe that politicians will
take the responsibility for the shipbuilding industry's
welfare.
- with regard to the number of persons employed and to wages:
To the extent that the production of ships was higher than- 15 -
it would have been without subsidies, the number of persons
employed was also higher than otherwise would has been the
case. But subsidization could not prevent world-wide demand
for ships from going down and the German yards from losing
international competitiveness. Therefore a .reduction in
employment was unavoidable. Although the shipbuilding in-
dustry has reduced its work-force since 1960 by 52 p.c,
wages have risen more than wages in total manufacturing (see
Table A2). Adjustment in the remuneration of labour reflec-
ting the real competitive conditions has not taken place.
This indicates that, presumably, subsidies have rested on
wages to a large extent .
- with regard to small and medium sized yards on the one hand
and large yards on the other hand: As was pointed out before
important protection measures were introduced in favour of
large yards. At the end of the sixties/beginning of the
seventies, some large yards were supported to provide fa-
cilities for the building of large ships; when it became
obvious that large shipbuilding was an obsolete activity in
Germany governments assisted in the rediversification of big
yards to those segments of the market in which the medium
and small sized yards had been fairly successful at that
time. Thus governments distorted competition within the
shipbuilding industry in favour of large yards and at the
expense of smaller ones.
For example, in Schleswig-Holstein there are only two other
industries (mineral oil, printing and copying), which pay
higher wages than shipbuilding.- 16 -
with regard to the development of regions: As far as subsi-
dization has caused high wages in the shipbuilding industry
it has obstructed the adjustment process of those regions
where yards are located, because other economic activities
had to compete with these high labor costs. Thus, the open-
ing of new businesses, the expansion of existing ones as
well as the establishment of firms from other regions were
all hampered . The subsidization of the yards more than
compensated the financial assistance from regional programs
which other firms could claim if they v/ere to undertake
2
investment in regions subject to regional policy schemes .
Thus in assisted regions, where the shipbuilding industry is
relatively important for the labour-market, the desired
effect of regional policy was more than offset by the subsi-
dies given to shipbuilding.
with regard to other industries: As the intersectoral pat-
tern of subsidization shows, there are only a few sectors
(agriculture, mining, aerospace, railways, housing, pri-
vate-non-profit-institutions) which are protected to a hig-
her degree than shipbuilding (Juttemeier, 1986.). Especially
Distortions in competition between large and other yards cau-
sed by state interventions are indicated for example by the
fact, that in 1984 the direct labour cost per hour could be
calculated with 75,— to 80,— Deutsche Mark on Howaldtswerke-
Deutsche Werft AG against 45,— to 50,— Deutsche Mark on
small and medium sized yards (Unabhangige SachverstSndigen-
kommission, 1984).
2
The shipbuilding industry received more financial aid out of
specific programs than all other industries in the four coa-
stal states out of regional programs (Lammers, 1984 b).- 17 -
compared with other industries in the manufacturing sector,
subsidization policy provided a competitiveness that was only
artificial: In shipbuilding factor payments for labor and
capital could be 29.5 p.c. higher than without subsidies com-
pared with 2.5 p.c. in the manufacturing sector as a whole.
4. Concluding Remarks
What can be learned from protection of the shipbuilding in-
dustry in the Federal Republic? There are several lessons.
First: Governments do not seem able to solve the adjustment
problems of an industry, simply because politicians cannot
predict the future better than individual firms can. On the
contrary, the problems of the shipbuilding industry were wor-
sened by state interventions. Second: Governments misunder-
stand the character of structural change. Many interventions
in favour of the yards were stated as facilitating the struc-
tural adjustment process. But the need for structural adjust-
ment exist not only within an industry, but also between in-
dustries. Therefore governments have hampered structural
change even if they supported the rationalization or reor-
ganization of the yards. This is true all the more as these
interventions have generally led to an increase in capacity.
Third: Any one subsidy generates its successor. In supporting
the yards especially with interventions that influenced in-
vestment decisions, governments have become extortable for
further subsidies. Whenever supply or demand, conditions took
another development than governments had expected, as in fact- 18 -
was the rule, representatives of the shipbuilding industry-
could refer to former governmental statements and state inter-
ventions with good arguments.
It is frequently argued that the German shipbuilding industry
needs subsidies because shipbuilding markets are heavily dis-
torted by subsidies which other countries grant their ship-
building industries . No doubt other countries support their
yards to a very high extent, too; possibly the degree of pro-
tection in some countries is higher than in the Federal Re-
public. But the subsidization in other countries does not
justify doing the same. For the economy as a whole, reduction
of subsidies for the national shipbuilding industry is pro-
fitable (Hiemenz, Weiss, 1984). Other shipbuilding countries
1
subsidies also are not the cause for the problems of the Ger-
man shipbuilding industry at all. Instead, they stem from
changing demand and supply conditions on a worldwide scale.
As a matter of fact, whenever market developments hit German
yards hard, important subsidy programs were introduced in
favour of the German shipbuilding industry in response. This
was the case in 1962 when the first Shipbuilding Assistance
Program was started: In the years before, Japan had conquered
large shares of the market very rapidly. This was also the
This is the official argument of the Federal Government for
their subsidization policy (see e.g. Deutscher Bundestag,
1985). Of course, the German shipbuilding association is using
it to claim subsidies (see e.g. Verband der deutschen Schiff-
bauindustrie e.V., 1984).- 19 -
case at the end of the sixties/beginning of the seventies,
when governments supported the large yards by investment as-
sistance: Other shipbuilding countries had specialized in new
ships and applied new production processes before, thus being
able to react to new developments in demand of ships better
than German yards. This was also the case in the second half
of the seventies, when several additional programs in favour
of the yards were introduced: The worldwide decrease in demand
for ships had worked itself through to the employment level of
German yards and new shipbuilding countries had become serious
competitors. And, finally, this is the case in the present
situation: A further decrease in the demand for ships and
growing competition from developing countries are the causes
of the present problems of the German shipbuilding industry
and not subsidies of other countries.
In countries with levels of economic development comparable to
the Federal Republic as the most West European countries,
subsidies for shipbuilding are paid for the very same reason:
The yards in these countries are under pressure caused by
changing supply and demand conditions. But although the ship-
building industries in these countries were protected, they
were not able to stabilize production on the level of earlier
years, not at all defending their position in the shipbuilding
market as the cases of Sweden, France, the U.K., Denmark, Nor-
way and the Netherlands show (see table 1 and Al) . This is
another strong indication that subsidies in other industri-
alized countries have not caused the problems of German ship-- 20 -
yards. As far as protection of shipbuilding in countries like
South-Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, or the People's Republic of China
is concerned, it may be true that state interventions have
reinforced the competitive pressure on German yards. But they
are irrelevant on the background of the real comparative ad-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping (various issues). - Verband der deutschen Schiffbauindustrie e.V. (various issues). - Cten
























































































































































































































































































































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt(a). - Statistisches Bundesamt(b). - CXm calculations.- 23 -
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